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Introduction
la b o r  a n d  a u th o r ita r ia n  
le g a c ie s
Teri L. Caraway, Stephen Crowley, 
and Maria Lorena Cook
What determines the ability of workers to defend their interests in the contempo­
rary world? Outside of advanced capitalist societies, much of the explanation has 
centered on the twin epochal changes of the last few decades, namely democ­
ratization and globalization, with most arguing that the political opportunities 
created by democratization are outweighed by the economic constraints imposed 
by globalization. In this volume we focus on authoritarian legacies, an important 
factor that is frequently overlooked but is often crucial for understanding the 
opportunities and constraints workers face across much of the world.
For much of the late twentieth century, unions in Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, and Asia labored under authoritarian regimes that set strict boundar­
ies on their political and economic activities. Although the “workers’ states” of 
Eastern Europe created unions with near-universal membership, those unions 
were subordinate to ruling Communist parties, had little to no independent 
voice, and sought primarily to ensure that workers were productive members 
of society (Crowley and Ost 2001). In parts of Latin America, authoritarian 
backlashes in the 1960s and 1970s produced military regimes that repressed the 
region’s politically active unions (O’Donnell 1973). These dictatorships saw labor 
as partly responsible for the political instability of earlier democratic regimes 
and as an ongoing threat (Valenzuela 1989; Drake 1996). In East and Southeast 
Asia, authoritarian regimes usually subordinated unions in exclusionary corpo- 
ratist arrangements that sharply constrained the ability of workers to mobilize
l
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collectively. Efforts to organize independently were greeted with violence and 
intimidation (Deyo 1989; Hadiz 1997).
Given the antilabor orientation of many authoritarian regimes, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that worker mobilization was often an important element of the 
popular protests that heralded the end of authoritarian rule (Fishman 1990; 
Seidman 1994; Adler and Webster 1995; Drake 1996; Collier and Mahoney 
1997; Koo 2000; Encarnacion 2001; Ost 2005; Y. Lee 2011).' After years and 
even decades of labor repression under authoritarian regimes, democratization 
promised more influence and power for unions. With democracy would come 
freedom of association, which would put an end to state-enforced union mono­
polies. Enhanced respect for civil liberties would create more political space for 
organized actors to advocate for their economic interests. Elections would open 
the way for the restoration or development of mutually supportive ties between 
parties and unions. These political transformations would make it easier—and 
safer—for unions to mobilize, both in the workplace and in the broader political 
arena.
It was precisely this promise of newfound power for labor that caused some 
scholars to identify labor as a potential destabilizing factor in fragile new democ­
racies (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Przeworski 1991; Haggard 
and Kaufman 1995). Despite the greater opportunities for workers to exert their 
collective power, however, the increased political and organizational freedoms 
of democracy have brought mixed results. Unionization rates have fallen world­
wide in recent years, but the drop has been particularly steep in a number of 
postauthoritarian countries, and real wages remained constant and even fell for 
prolonged periods in many of them as well (International Labour Office 1997; 
Crowley 2004; L. Cook 2010). Where labor had partisan allies, the strength and 
utility of that bond weakened considerably (Gibson 1997; Burgess 1999, 2004; 
Avdagic 2004). As Linda Cook (2010) observed in her analysis of labor rights in 
postcommunist Eastern Europe, labor has “more rights” but “less power.”
One reason for this outcome, of course, is that neoliberal market reforms—or 
in a word, globalization—often accompanied democratization. The market lib­
eralization and structural adjustment policies advocated by neoliberals funda­
mentally restructured economies and deepened their integration into global 
markets (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Capital became increasingly mobile and 
therefore powerful, while labor remained typically rooted in place (Tilly 1995; 
Jacoby 1995). The intensification of competitive market pressures, in turn, re­
sulted in substantial job losses in uncompetitive sectors of the economy and 
prompted employers to pursue greater flexibility in their workforces (Standing 
1997; Seidman 2004). In many countries, informal-sector employment has in­
creased and exceeds that in the formal sector (Freeman 2009). Retaining existing
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union members, much less organizing new ones, has proven difficult in the con­
text of increased precariousness. These processes have affected long-standing 
democracies in the developing world, such as India and Costa Rica, as well.
The “dual transitions” of democratization and neoliberal reform therefore 
push in different directions for organized labor. Whereas democratization has 
potentially enhanced labor’s associational power, globalization and market re­
form have undercut labor’s structural power (Wright 2000). Moreover, globaliza­
tion weakens not only labor but also potentially its most valuable ally, the state, 
resulting in a downward spiral as flagging state capacity vitiates the labor rights 
guaranteed by national law (Tilly 1995). Yet, as Silver (2003) has noted, capital’s 
endless search for new products and new sites of production also brings with it 
cycles of protest that create dynamic labor movements. Although labor may be 
down, it is not out, as evidenced by union resurgence in Argentina (Etchemendy 
and Collier 2007), union resilience in Slovenia (Feldmann 2006; Crowley and 
Stanojevic 2011), and signs of renewed feistiness in Indonesia (Juliawan 2011; 
Caraway and Ford 2014). Even in authoritarian China, worker protests have 
put pressure on the state to accommodate some of their demands (C. Fee 2007; 
Solinger 2009).
Moreover, despite the generally gloomy picture, race-to-the-bottom pressures 
have not had uniform effects on labor in new democracies, which suggests that 
unions enter these struggles with different resources in distinct strategic contexts 
(Candland and Sil 2001). For example, in the realm of collective labor rights, 
scholars employing discrete measurements and methodologies agree that the 
gains in labor rights that were made in new democracies have not been com­
pletely undone by global economic pressures (M. Cook 1998, 2002, 2007; Cin- 
granelli 2002; Murillo 2005; Murillo and Schrank 2005; Neumayer and De Soysa 
2005; Mosley and Uno 2007; Caraway 2009; Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 
2009). Similarly, with respect to individual labor rights, while some studies have 
found more flexibilizing reforms in the area of individual rights than collective 
rights, some countries have nevertheless enacted laws that offered greater pro­
tections for individual labor rights (M. Cook 1998, 2007; Murillo 2005; Caraway 
2009, 2010a; F. Cook 2010). There is sharp variation among democracies in the 
level of collective and individual labor rights, and the gap between de jure and 
de facto levels is wide in most countries (Burgess 2010; Cammett and Posusney 
2010; Caraway 2010a; F. Cook 2010; Stallings 2010). Yet enshrining stronger pro­
tections into law provides workers and unions with important levers of power 
that should not be dismissed lightly.
Scholars have also shown that despite the perilous politics of dual transitions, 
unions varied significantly in how they navigated the shoals of neoliberal re­
forms (Fevitsky and Way 1998; Burgess 1999,2004; Murillo 2000,2001; Ost 2000;
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Madrid 2003; Tafel and Boniface 2003; Avdagic 2004). Some successfully resisted 
reforms, others fought reforms, but not very hard (and hence not very success­
fully), and yet others engaged in “bargained liberalization” (Webster and Adler 
1999) or revived national-level social bargaining (Encarnacion 1997; Royo 2006).
Neither democratization nor globalization, then, has produced homogeneous 
effects on labor.2 Simply put, a major reason for this variation is that organized 
labor entered the postauthoritarian era from different starting points (Locke and 
Thelen 1995). In order to fully understand this variation, we need to explore the 
deeper historical forces that have shaped labor’s capabilities and the terrain on 
which it acts. We argue that legacies whose roots lie in authoritarian regimes sig­
nificantly influence labor’s ability to respond to new challenges and opportuni­
ties presented by dual transitions. Unions enter the democratic era with varying 
organizational resources, membership bases, partisan relationships, ideological 
baggage, and mobilizational capacities. This inherited set of resources, rela­
tions, and capacities considerably shapes the trajectories that labor follows once 
authoritarianism ends.
Similar to Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier’s seminal Shaping the Political 
Arena (1991), we draw on a historical-institutionalist perspective, centering our 
analysis on how past institutional configurations, in particular the institutions 
associated with labor incorporation, endure and affect politics many years after 
their founding. Although we are explaining distinct outcomes, our approach 
draws heavily on the theoretical insights from Shaping the Political Arena. Col­
lier and Collier (1991) argued that the “initial incorporation” of labor during 
the first half of the twentieth century in Latin America—a period during which 
the state and political actors first recognized labor as a legal actor and potential 
political force—had important consequences for subsequent regime dynamics. 
During this period, states and parties fundamentally reconfigured their relation­
ships with unions, establishing new institutions that regulated unions and labor 
relations. We extend Collier and Collier’s analysis in time by addressing how lega­
cies from predemocratic regimes have shaped labor’s fate from the 1980s to the 
present, focusing on the impact of past labor incorporation on labor politics after 
democratic transitions. The temporal and geographic scope of our analysis also 
means that we place less emphasis on initial incorporation than Collier and Col­
lier and give more attention to recent episodes in which authoritarian regimes 
refounded labor institutions or grafted new institutions onto old. We argue that 
the web of formal and informal institutions established prior to democratic tran­
sitions has proven to be remarkably sticky and continues to shape labor politics 
decades later.
Given the fundamental transformations many of these countries have under­
gone and the time that has elapsed since the initial democratic breakthrough,
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some scholars seeking to explain the problems faced by organized labor have 
argued that emphasizing legacies can be misleading because “there comes a time 
when you have to stop blaming the past” and instead focus on more proximate 
causes, such as the pressure for market liberalization (Meardi 2012, 172; see also 
Bohle and Greskovits 2006). Although we do not contend that authoritarian 
legacies are the only—or always the most important—factor that shapes labor’s 
present, the following chapters demonstrate that in many countries the imprint 
of the past continues to weigh heavily, interacting with more proximate causes in 
ways that have both benefited and harmed the development of labor movements. 
Ignoring the past, we therefore argue, is even more misleading than merely blam­
ing the past.
Many works about labor in new democracies draw on authoritarian legacies 
to explain specific outcomes such as labor weakness, mobilization against eco­
nomic reforms, and labor law reforms. None so far have systematically addressed 
how the effects of authoritarian legacies evolve over time, or traced how varia­
tions across such legacies affect the distinctive pathways and outcomes that labor 
has experienced in different settings.3 In this volume, we put legacies front and 
center and assess their comparative impact on a variety of outcomes relevant to 
labor in widely divergent settings.4
To this end, we adopt a cross-regional approach to the study of authoritar­
ian legacies. Aside from the inherent appeal of a geographically diverse com­
parative study, historical and institutional differences among the regions result 
in qualitatively distinct legacies. A cross-regional approach allows us to consider 
a broader menu of legacies and thus to develop a richer analysis of how legacies 
affect labor in new democracies. We focus on three regions— East and Southeast 
Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America—where many countries have under­
gone democratization and for which sufficient comparative work exists to make 
empirically and theoretically grounded generalizations about regional patterns.5 
By expanding the universe of empirical cases, Working through the Past yields 
important insights about labor in new democracies.
Defining Authoritarian Legacies
Comparative historical scholars frequently deploy the term “legacy,” but they at­
tach quite different meanings to it. In Shaping the Political Arena, Collier and Col­
lier conceptualize legacies as a dependent variable that is intimately tied to their 
critical juncture analytical framework (see also Mahoney [2001]). For them, leg­
acies are the outcomes produced by the political dynamics unleashed in the wake 
of a critical juncture. Labor incorporation constituted such a critical juncture,
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and different forms of labor incorporation produced a set of institutional and 
political consequences that in turn generated distinct legacies.
Far more commonly, however, scholars treat legacies as causal factors— 
independent variables—that contribute to a specific outcome. Most broadly, 
“legacy” connotes the continued influence of the past on the present, but it is 
defined and operationalized in widely varying ways. Some scholars employ lega­
cies as explanatory variables without providing a precise definition of the term 
(Hagopian 1993; Mahoney 2003; Bernhard and Karakoi; 2007), while others 
define legacy so broadly (including a country’s religious and ethnic diversity, 
for example) as to make it a synonym for historical background (Pop-Eleches 
2007). The term “legacy” invariably implies a causal claim about how past events, 
institutions, configurations of power, and social relations contributed to par­
ticular outcomes in later historical periods. As Elster, Offe, and Preuss (1998, 
293) explain, legacies are a “determinant of present outcomes that stem from the 
(distant) past, such as inherited endowments of actors with material resources, 
mentalities, and traditions.” Thus, legacies have also become shorthand to de­
scribe the “initial conditions” or starting point from which politics unfolded dur­
ing political transitions (Linz and Stepan 1996; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Ekiert and 
Hanson 2003; Pop-Eleches 2007).
For the concept of legacy to be useful, however, scholars must move beyond 
the obvious if important point that “history matters.” Throughout this work we 
conceive of legacies as having a historically recent and identifiable genesis rather 
than the deep historical explanations employed by some who invoke the con­
cept.6 For example, we exclude from our use of legacy the deep legacies invoked 
in different ways by Braudel (1972-73) and Putnam (1994) to explain seemingly 
entrenched patterns of behavior across great expanses of time. There are meth­
odological as well as practical reasons for this: we agree with Kitschelt (2003) that 
analyses that lean heavily on historically deep legacies often end up with interest­
ing correlations, but typically fail to provide a causal mechanism that links past 
to present. Legacies are not merely historically produced variables or historical 
background. Such a conceptualization is overly encompassing—it can include 
just about everything—and usually fails to trace the processes through which the 
legacies endure and are actively reproduced. We therefore conceptualize legacies 
as historical rather than constant causes (Stinchcombe 1968). Constant causes 
operate year after year and produce relative continuity in their effects. An ex­
ample of a constant cause is the high propensity to strike exhibited by work­
ers in isolated export enclaves (Collier and Collier 1991). Historical causes, by 
contrast, shape an outcome at a particular point in time and establish a set of 
institutions that persist and reproduce themselves without the recurrence of the 
original cause.
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For our purposes, then, legacies are generated in identifiable periods of time, 
and their reproduction or reconfiguration can be traced through constantly 
evolving economic, political, and social contexts (Thelen 1999; Pierson 2004). 
In other words, we believe that it is crucial to engage in process tracing in order 
to sketch out the causal mechanisms between what is to be explained and what 
is doing the explaining, and to demonstrate empirically the processes through 
which these legacies endure.
Moreover, in this volume we focus explicitly on authoritarian legacies rather 
than historical legacies per se. Scholarship on authoritarian legacies is a distinct 
subset of the legacies literature. The invocation of authoritarian legacies nec­
essarily presumes that new democracies do not begin their lives with a clean 
slate—the authoritarian past continues to shape the democratic present. Actors 
from the authoritarian era, such as political parties, the military, and ruling 
oligarchies, often exert a lingering and powerful influence in new democra­
cies (Payne 2000; Grzymala-Busse 2002; Robison and Hadiz 2004; Winters 
2011). Scholars have also observed that institutional and ideological legacies 
limit the prospects for reform (Jowitt 1993; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Ekiert and 
Hanson 2003; Cesarini and Hite 2004), and that lingering atomization from 
the authoritarian period diminishes the influence of civil society actors (How­
ard 2003). Terms such as “hybrid regimes” and “illiberal democracy” reflect 
the perceived democratic deficits in new democracies that have often stemmed 
from authoritarian legacies (Zakaria 1997; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 
2002; Robertson 2011).
Implicit in the invocation of authoritarian legacies is the understanding that 
the institutional transformations that occurred after democratization were not 
simply created by powerful interests out of whole cloth, but rather that these ac­
tors’ strategies were crafted from a society’s available institutional and cultural 
material.7 These inherited features from the past interacted with features of the 
transition context to shape future political developments in new democracies.
In an extensive review of the literature on authoritarian legacies, Cesarini and 
Hite (2004) uncovered three common conceptualizations of authoritarian lega­
cies: formal structures and institutions inherited from authoritarian regimes; the 
lingering power and influence of traditional/conservative groups; and cultural 
or psychological manifestations of authoritarianism. Authoritarian legacies, they 
argue, are aspects of the past that “survive democratic transitions and intervene 
in the quality and practice of post-authoritarian democracy” (Cesarini and Hite 
2004,4). Building on Cesarini and Hite, we define authoritarian legacies as actors, 
formal institutions, informal practices, and cultural or ideological frameworks that 
newly democratic regimes inherit from authoritarian regimes and that shape politics 
in the democratic period.
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Of course all societies—whether authoritarian or democratic— are shaped by 
the past. We focus on authoritarian legacies rather than on all historical legacies 
affecting labor, however, because in the cases we examine—and indeed, in virtu­
ally all postauthoritarian societies—labor institutions were profoundly shaped 
by the authoritarian period. Authoritarian governments often deeply restructure 
labor relations. Lacking the legitimation mechanism of meaningful elections, 
authoritarian systems face unique challenges from subordinate social groups, 
especially labor, and typically seek distinct means to constrain labor, and some­
times to mobilize labor and seek legitimacy from it. Most notably, authoritarian 
regimes create institutions that give the state much greater discretionary au­
thority to intervene in and shape labor relations. In addition, given that there 
are fewer checks on the state’s use of force against its citizens, authoritarian re­
gimes typically use a heavier dose of repression than democracies in disciplining 
unions.
Our emphasis on how authoritarian regimes shaped labor institutions departs 
to some extent from the Colliers’ focus on initial incorporation. In many of the 
cases discussed in this volume, initial incorporation took place under authori­
tarianism. In Eastern Europe, for example, labor relations were forged during 
the mass industrialization under communism. In other cases, such as Chile 
and Indonesia, the authoritarian regimes led by General Augusto Pinochet and 
Suharto refounded labor institutions in ways that fundamentally transformed 
the institutions created during the initial incorporation. Although in most of 
these cases initial incorporation took place under the authoritarian regime that 
preceded the most recent democratization, in Argentina and Brazil initial incor­
poration occurred during authoritarian-populist regimes in the 1930s and 1940s. 
The founding labor institutions from this period largely survived later episodes 
of democratization and authoritarianism, and were then bequeathed to new 
democracies in the 1980s. The durability of authoritarian legacies in Argentina 
and Brazil raises the analytic question of how and why these legacies were repro­
duced across many decades and multiple regimes. In the Philippines, by contrast, 
initial incorporation occurred under democracy and President Ferdinand Mar­
cos integrated many of these founding institutions into authoritarian-era labor 
practices. Rather than refounding institutions, he grafted other practices atop 
preexisting institutions. Here part of the analytic task entails reflecting on why 
Marcos retained these institutions and on how the changes that he introduced 
created a distinct set of institutions that were then passed on to the Corazon 
Aquino administration.
These variations among authoritarian regimes further reinforce a fundamen­
tal point of this volume: our use of authoritarian legacies as an analytic category 
is not an assertion that all authoritarian regimes are the same. The differences
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among authoritarian regimes are crucial to how we theorize about the impact of 
authoritarian legacies on contemporary labor politics.
Theorizing the Impact of Authoritarian Legacies
Our approach to analyzing the impact of authoritarian legacies falls within the 
historical-institutionalist tradition. We conceptualize legacies as past institu­
tional configurations that “constrain and refract,” but do not determine, subse­
quent outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992,3). In our case, we focus 
on how actors, ideologies, and institutions with roots in a prior authoritarian 
period have a causal effect on outcomes under democracy despite the end of the 
regimes that created them. Legacies seldom persist as the mere dead weight of 
the past, however. As historical institutionalists have observed, institutions, once 
they are created, depend on mechanisms of reproduction, adaptation, or support 
from powerful actors, or all three, to be sustained (Thelen 1999). This is especially 
so for authoritarian legacies since, by definition, they are often transplanted into 
a starkly different environment from the authoritarian past in which they were 
previously sustained (Cesarini and Hite 2004).
If authoritarian legacies are not the mere dead weight of the past, how do 
they affect labor in new democracies? Perhaps paradoxically, analyzing the im­
pact of legacies is an exercise in explicating political change. The analysis of how 
and why institutions change has become the primary focus of contemporary 
debates in historical institutionalism. Early work in this tradition often relied 
on punctuated equilibrium models whereby change (often the result of external 
shocks) happened in big bursts followed by long periods of stability (Thelen 
1999; Streeck and Thelen 2005a). The critical juncture framework is perhaps the 
best-known example of a punctuated equilibrium model of change among com­
parative historical scholars (Collier and Collier 2002). Theoretically, critical junc­
tures are branching points between path dependent processes; they are periods of 
rupture where contingency and uncertainty make dramatic political change pos­
sible (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). During these “unsettled periods” old rules 
and practices are much more pliable than in settled periods, when institutional 
arrangements tend to harden (Swidler 1986). Once clear of the critical juncture, 
institutions “lock-in” and settle into a new path of relative stability (Thelen 2003; 
Pierson 2004). In this path-dependent perspective, legacies act like a lamp that 
illuminates some pathways while leaving others darkened, or a trail along which 
some walkways are steeper or more slippery and therefore less inviting than oth­
ers. They are analogous to Weir’s (1992) notion of bounded innovation, where 
“decisions at one point in time restrict subsequent possibilities by sending policy
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off onto particular tracks, along which ideas and interests develop and institu­
tions and strategies adapt” (251).8
On the one hand, a critical juncture framework seems perfectly suited to our 
analytical task, since democratization often results from external shocks and 
produces dramatic change. The institutions forged during the transition—the 
critical juncture—could fundamentally transform what preceded it and set the 
institutions on a new path. In this model of change, authoritarian legacies take 
the form of antecedent conditions that interact with the transition context to 
crystallize into fundamentally distinct institutional configurations.9 In this vol­
ume, Marko Grdesics chapter on the former Yugoslavia (chapter 5) comes the 
closest to this model of change. Here, the legacy of worker self-management 
interacted with the distinct economic and political environments in Croatia, 
Serbia, and Slovenia to produce dramatically different relations among unions, 
parties, and the state. In this case, similar legacies had different effects, depending 
on the context of the critical juncture.
The experience of other postcommunist countries can also be interpreted 
with a critical juncture framework. In this case, the shock of capitalist trans­
formation and insertion into the global economy occurred at a moment when 
labor unions were generally distrusted and viewed—at times by labor activists 
themselves—as unneeded holdovers from the Communist era (Crowley 2004; 
Ost 2005, also chapter 4 in this volume). The result was a massive hemorrhag­
ing of membership. Although the anticommunist legacy may have attenuated 
over time as unions and workers became acclimated to the new capitalist en­
vironment, in the meantime unions had become much smaller and weaker 
organizations. Thus, the anticommunist legacy combined with the transition to 
capitalism to cause both a dramatic decline in union membership and to create 
economies with relatively flexible labor markets that were dependent on foreign 
capital. Once this path is taken, unions can engage in new organizing, but they 
do so from a much lower base.
On the other hand, as much of the new work on institutional change has em­
phasized, exogenous shocks may also prompt less obvious, evolutionary changes 
that force institutions to adapt, innovate, or change in subtle ways (Thelen 2003; 
Steinmo 2010). Even in more settled periods, institutions are subject to renego­
tiation, to “drift” in their significance, to the “layering” of new institutions on old, 
and thus to “gradual transformation” (Streeck and Thelen 2005b; Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010). The result may be a hybridization, recombination, and bricolage 
of old and new (Campbell 1997; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Galvan and Sil 2007; 
Mrozowicki 2011).
The chapters in this volume contain many examples of reconfigured legacies 
produced through an interaction of the old and the new. One reason that these
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reconfigurations occur is that institutional arrangements reflect distributions of 
resources and power, so actors fight to defend the inherited institutions that ben­
efit them (Mahoney and Thelen 2010,8). For instance, Adalberto Cardoso (chap­
ter 8, this volume) relates that in Brazil even the more militant unions defended 
provisions of the labor code that they had once criticized, in recognition of their 
protective function during periods of economic and political uncertainty. In 
Argentina, Graciela Bensusan and Maria Lorena Cook (chapter 7, this volume) 
show that the Peronist legacy gave unions significant resources with which to 
defend their interests. Although governments in Argentina tried to weaken union 
resources during both democratization and the neoliberal reform period, by mo­
bilizing their members and enlisting their historic allies in the Peronist party, 
unions ensured that important parts of this legacy survived. In this case, as in 
others in this volume, institutions not only constrain but also enable, providing 
strategic resources for actors in responding to new challenges and opportunities 
(Thelen 2003,213).
In some cases, it is not so much labor but newly democratic governments that 
find utility in defending old institutions. In her chapter on the Philippines, Jane 
Hutchison (chapter 3) notes that the Marcos regime developed tripartite institu­
tions of labor, employers, and the state as a mechanism for co-opting conserva­
tive unions and gaining international legitimacy. The Aquino and subsequent 
democratic administrations found these tripartite institutions to be useful as 
well, since their consensus style of decision making allowed for the sidelining 
of reformist demands from the left. So democratic governments retained and 
even expanded them. Many union leaders cooperated, since tripartism further 
entrenched their position as national representatives in a context where they had 
little connection to their members. Yet seemingly similar institutions have differ­
ent consequences in distinct settings. In Indonesia, as Teri L. Caraway s chapter 
indicates (chapter 1), tripartite institutions from the Suharto era were trans­
formed into institutions that activated rather than pacified labor. This example 
of institutional drift was made possible by the radical decentralization of the 
tripartite minimum-wage setting boards, which both allowed members to hold 
their local leaders accountable and for union leaders to mobilize their member­
ship to pressure local governments to side with workers instead of employers.
Another form of evolutionary change is institutional layering, in which new 
institutions exist alongside the old. For example, in Indonesia and the Philip­
pines, restrictions on strikes persisted alongside the various reforms that restored 
or strengthened collective rights. In the Philippines, Hutchison attributes the 
tight control over strikes to the desire of democratic governments to prevent 
mobilization by radical unions. At the same time, the co-optation of the con­
servative unions and their distance from members ensured that they would not
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push too hard for further reforms. Caraway focuses less on why these restrictions 
remained in place in Indonesia and more on how they have channeled labor 
conflict into protests outside the workplace. In both cases, the evolution of labor 
law is shaped by legacies from authoritarian rule.
Legacies matter, then, for their ability to shape political pathways for years, 
sometimes decades, after the events that first give rise to them have passed. This 
does not necessarily mean that legacies survive unchanged. Although in some 
cases they may persist largely intact, legacies are more likely to interact with ele­
ments of new political contexts to produce novel configurations or to transform 
themselves gradually via evolutionary mechanisms of institutional change.10
Authoritarianism and Its Aftermath: Legacy 
Unions, Labor Law, and Ideology
In this volume we are specifically concerned with labor legacies: legacies that 
constrain and enable labor’s capacity to mobilize and to advocate for its orga­
nizational interests and worker welfare. Since labor enters the newly democratic 
era from different starting points—in part as a consequence of authoritarian 
legacies—a crucial first step in demonstrating the effects of legacies on labor’s 
fate in new democracies is to give some sense of how labor incorporation varied 
and why these variations matter.
As Collier and Collier (2002) argued, labor incorporation had profound con­
sequences for the political trajectories of Latin American countries. We argue that 
the form of labor incorporation also affects the potential for the development of 
strong unions in new democracies. Authoritarian regimes—whether populist, 
conservative, or communist— provided an assortment of legal and institutional 
assets to state-backed unions as a means to both control and secure support from 
labor movements. Although incorporation involved placing some constraints on 
unions, states also commonly offered inducements to elicit labor’s cooperation 
(Collier and Collier 1979). The balance of inducements and constraints varied 
dramatically from country to country. The mode of labor incorporation affected 
not only unionization rates but also labor law, links with political parties, orga­
nizational resources, the relationship between unions and members, the role of 
unions in the workplace, and the ability of unions to mobilize independently of 
the state and their partisan allies. These different regional models of incorpora­
tion can be described in the broadest terms as exclusionary corporatist (Asia), in­
clusionary corporatist (Latin America), and state paternalist (Eastern Europe)."
In exclusionary forms of labor incorporation in noncommunist Asia, states 
aimed to demobilize unions. Ruling parties opposed high rates of unionization,
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but they granted state-backed unions monopoly or near monopoly status. Even 
though virtually all unionized workers belonged to state-backed unions, these 
unions organized an insignificant share of the workforce (usually far less than 10 per­
cent). The benefits that unions derived from state sponsorship were meager and 
usually consisted of modest financial subsidies and office space. Union officers 
were not deeply integrated into ruling party structures. In these countries, unions 
entered the democratic era as depoliticized and enfeebled organizations that had 
weak links to their membership base and were dependent on employers and the 
state.
In Communist countries, workers were incorporated into a system best de­
scribed as state paternalist. State-backed unions enjoyed monopoly status, union 
membership was virtually universal, and unions functioned as “transmission 
belts” between Communist parties and workers (Pravda 1986; Thirkell, Petkov, 
and Vickerstaff 1998).12 Unions were subordinate to the Communist Party, which 
controlled the economic as well as the political spheres in the near absence of a 
private sector, a capitalist class, and an independent civil society. Workers were 
meant to work for the good of society as well as their wages, and the state’s dis­
tributive mechanisms were to provide for their social needs. Unions were also 
central to social needs provision. Party sponsorship guaranteed unions with 
basic institutional support, such as buildings for office space and routine dues 
collection, and unions invested these funds in services of benefit to their mem­
bers, such as summer camps, vacation facilities, and emergency credit. At the 
enterprise level, the primary tasks of unions were to motivate workers to fulfill 
the plan and to distribute valuable benefits and services to workers. Unions in 
postcommunist countries, therefore, entered the democratic era with extremely 
high density, but they were dependent on employers, had little experience mobi­
lizing their members or engaging in collective bargaining, and had no history of 
independence from the ruling party.
In inclusionary corporatist systems found in Latin America, ties between rul­
ing parties and unions were also close, but unions retained greater capacity to 
act independently. Ruling parties in inclusionary corporatist systems considered 
unions to be a supporting pillar of the regime, and the state both facilitated the 
growth of union membership and provided its union partners with significant 
institutional advantages over other unions. Unionization rates were lower than 
in state paternalist systems, but higher than in exclusionary models. Although 
unions rarely enjoyed a legal monopoly, labor laws favored established unions 
and permitted significant state intervention in labor relations, which states used 
to defend and discipline their union allies. The combination of labor-based 
parties and preferential treatment for unions allied with the dominant party, 
along with labor laws that allowed independent unions but favored established
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and state-allied unions, are the defining features of the inclusionary corporat­
ist model. Of the three illustrative models, unions in inclusionary corporatist 
systems entered the democratic era with the greatest mobilizational capacity. 
But they, too, depended on state-proffered benefits to maintain their member­
ship base, which often resulted in weak ties to their membership. Laws favor­
ing established unions also presented formidable challenges for new unions that 
sought to compete with state-backed unions. This model defines some of the 
largest and most industrialized Latin American countries—Mexico, Brazil, and 
Argentina—even if it does not represent all or even most countries in the region.
Variations in labor incorporation matter because their legacies shape the con­
ditions under which unions enter the newly democratic terrain. In the remainder 
of this section, we focus on three specific legacies that are especially likely to affect 
labor in new democracies: the survival of former state-backed unions (legacy 
unions), labor law, and ideology.
Legacy Unions
Perhaps one of the most obvious legacies of authoritarianism is that state-backed 
unions did not merely vanish with the transition to democracy. Caraway (2008) 
coined the term “legacy union” to describe unions allied with the previous au­
thoritarian regime that survive in the democratic era.13 Legacy unions are still 
the largest labor unions in almost every postcommunist country, as well as in 
Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Even in cases where independent 
unions have overtaken legacy unions, such as in South Korea and Poland, legacy 
unions are still one of the two largest unions in the country (Caraway 2012).
Although legacy unions share a number of common features—a dependence 
on the state and employers and weak links to members—there are also important 
differences among them. They vary in terms of the size of the membership they 
inherit, whether they enjoy a union monopoly, and the resources that regimes 
provide them. Inheriting legacy unions that organized a large proportion of the 
workforce would seem to be a positive thing for labor’s influence in new de­
mocracies. Yet legacy unions can negatively affect the strategic context in which 
unions that emerge after democratization struggle to gain members. The con­
tinued influence of legacy unions potentially impedes organizing efforts by new 
unions that might better represent worker interests.
Given their history of dependence on state backing, legacy unions often have 
both weak links to their members and minimal experience publicly advocating 
for them. Consequently, a large proportion of the organized workforce in new 
democracies belongs to unions that at best are conservative and inexperienced 
and at worst exploitative and corrupt.14 The extent to which legacy unions can be
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a positive or a negative force for workers in new democracies depends on their 
capacity to transform themselves. The incentives to reform vary in part based on 
the transition context and on the extent of the unions’ inherited advantages. Leg­
acy unions often inherit an array of material resources that make it possible for 
them to survive without transforming themselves. In some cases, legacy unions 
also inherit significant legal advantages, the most important of which are labor 
law provisions that favor established unions and hence provide some protection 
from new challengers.
Despite these inherited advantages that could block reform, democratization 
also puts pressure on legacy unions to change.15 A greater degree of freedom of 
association brings with it not only competition from new unions for member­
ship but also the chance for thwarted reformers inside legacy unions to defect 
and establish new unions. Labor laws and state authorities’ close relationship 
with legacy unions could block the exit option, of course, but the symbiotic rela­
tionship between unions and the state was usually weakened or shattered when 
authoritarian regimes fell.
Such dynamics remind us that legacy unions, like legacies generally, do not 
persist by inertia but need to be reproduced. As Stephen Crowley shows in his 
chapter on Russia (chapter 6), powerful actors can refashion legacies to their 
advantage. Early in his presidency, Vladimir Putin pushed through labor reforms 
over the objections of Russia’s independent unions by co-opting Russia’s domi­
nant legacy union. He secured its support for a more flexible labor code by ex­
ploiting that union’s historical dependence on the state and by incorporating 
provisions into the new labor code that gave the union a virtual legal monopoly 
on workers’ representation. Russia’s legacy union thus survived by cultivating 
new political partners and fighting to gain new advantages in exchange for giving 
up some past prerogatives.
The survival of the legacy union in Indonesia demonstrates another pattern 
through which legacies shape the organizing terrain in new democracies. The 
cutoff of state sponsorship disrupts the primary feedback mechanism that sus­
tains legacy unions. Such disruptions, in turn, create pressures for institutional 
evolution (Thelen 1999). To survive, Indonesia’s legacy union needed to find new 
guarantors, as did the legacy union in Russia, or else transform itself so that it 
could compete in the new environment. Yet not only has the Indonesian union 
failed to develop a sustained relationship with power brokers, it has not enacted 
the internal reforms that would allow it to thrive without state sponsorship (due 
in part to inherited procedures for leadership selection that allow past leaders to 
thwart reform). The result has been disintegration (Caraway, this volume).
In other places legacy unions were not so toxic a legacy. In parts of Latin 
America, labor incorporation took place under inclusionary populist (albeit
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authoritarian) regimes. These regimes were followed by periods of democratic 
and military rule, including right-wing authoritarian governments in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The authoritarian governments of this period did not sponsor legacy 
unions; they targeted unions and persecuted their members.16 Consequently, 
unions in Argentina and Brazil had a more antagonistic relationship with recent 
authoritarian regimes (see Bensusan and Cook, and Cardoso, in this volume). In 
the former Yugoslavia, self-management created autonomous workplaces, mak­
ing state-backed unions less central than in other Communist countries (Grdesic, 
this volume, chapter 5). David Ost (this volume, chapter 4) shows that Polands 
legacy union was less imposing than in other parts of Eastern Europe because the 
state-backed union lost its monopoly in 1980, was dissolved in 1981, then resur­
rected later in the decade as a rival to the then-underground Solidarity union. It 
thus emerged from authoritarian rule as a much weaker but more independent 
organization. These variations in the nature of legacy unions affect how such 
unions navigate the newly democratic terrain as well as new unions’ capacity to 
organize under democracy.
Labor Law
The system of labor law inherited from authoritarian regimes is another im­
portant legacy that shapes labor politics in new democracies. Democratization 
typically produces strong pressures to reform authoritarian-era labor codes that 
repressed collective labor rights (M. Cook 2007). Legally sanctioned union mo­
nopolies in exclusionary and state paternalist systems were often the first item 
on the chopping block. But in inclusionary systems where state-backed unions 
did not depend on monopoly status for their hegemony, aspects of the labor 
code that favored already established unions remained unchanged. These un­
reformed labor laws shaped the terrain on which unions organized during the 
transition and beyond. They could strengthen legacy unions that colluded with 
management, as they did in Mexico, by making it hard for challengers to dis­
place legacy unions in the workplace. The laws could also provide unions with 
ample resources that would prove important in defending their members. Pro­
visions of populist-era labor laws in Argentina that centralized collective bar­
gaining, provided for its extension to nonunionized workers, and gave unions 
control over social welfare funds granted former state-backed unions market and 
organizational power that would be the envy of unions in much of the world 
(M. Cook 2007). The relative strength of Argentine unions today is due in part to 
the persistence of these labor laws.
Even where labor laws are significantly changed, the starting point for reform 
negotiations is usually the labor code inherited from the authoritarian regime.
INTRODUCTION 17
The contours of labor law at the time of transition thus shape the battles to come, 
determining what some actors want to change and what others wish to keep. In 
Asia, the labor codes of many countries were both protective and repressive—they 
protected workers by strictly regulating individual labor contracts, but repressed 
collective labor mobilization (Koo 2000; Caraway 2004). After democratization, 
conservatives in countries with “protectively repressive” labor laws could not op­
pose the recognition of freedom of association for long, which proved to be an 
advantage for workers. Individual protections inherited from the authoritarian 
past also put workers in a stronger position during labor reform negotiations, 
since unions only needed to defend existing rights (and mobilize their members 
for this purpose), while employers (and perhaps the state) were put in the posi­
tion of taking away those protections. Most authoritarian regimes also placed 
restrictions on the right to strike. In these cases, unions aimed to reduce strike 
limits while employers (and often the state) preferred to maintain them. The key 
point is that the battle of labor reform is fought on a strategic terrain determined 
in large part by labor laws inherited from the authoritarian past.
Ideology
Labor incorporation entailed not only the structuring of labor relations through 
law and state or party-union relations but also their legitimation through various 
ideologies. These systems of labor incorporation sometimes invited ideological 
backlash and resistance that redefined how citizens and workers viewed the role 
of unions in society, or else they generated radical views that questioned the 
subservience of workers to the state. Ideological legacies are therefore helpful in 
explaining how actors define and pursue their interests, both why actors do what 
they do and why they fail to do certain things. Following Swidler (1986), ideo­
logical legacies can also be viewed as part of a society’s cultural tool kit, materials 
to be fought over and to fight with, from which powerful actors might construct 
new institutional arrangements. These ideological legacies can be as sticky as 
more tangible organizational and legal legacies.17
In much of Eastern Europe, but particularly in Poland, an ideological backlash 
against unions grew out of the “workers’ states.” Moreover, the task of the post­
communist transformations was not simply to transition from authoritarianism 
to democracy, as challenging as that is, but also from communism to capitalism, 
a transition that Polish workers themselves were instrumental in bringing about. 
The problem for workers there was not just a “communist legacy” but also an 
“anticommunist legacy” that led both workers and many union leaders to doubt 
the relevance of unions in a capitalist democracy (Crowley and Ost 2001; Ost 
2005). The dilemma, then, was not only institutional but also ideational. The
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traditional political orientations of Left and Right made little sense, and neither 
did the questions of what political alliances unions should seek or what sort of 
alternatives they should strive for. In the former Yugoslavia, a rather different 
legacy of self-management, one that was perceived as more legitimate, provided 
unions with a more advantageous tool kit that they could use to defend their 
position during democratic transitions. In Russia, even when Communist-era 
policies were discredited at the macro level, workplace norms about the respon­
sibilities of a firm to its workers—the “moral legacy of an ‘immoral economy’”— 
gave workers a moral foundation on which to contest privatization (Sil 2001).
Understandings of the past can also shape how actors define realistic or desir­
able goals and allies. The legacy of fear inspired by harsh authoritarian regimes 
and the strength of the outgoing authoritarian coalition may make democratic 
actors more willing to compromise on their agenda for fear that pushing too 
hard could jeopardize the democratic transition (Haagh 2002). In his chapter 
on Chile, Volker Frank (chapter 9) demonstrates how ideological legacies kept 
the democratic Concertacion government from enacting prolabor policies and 
legal reforms during the crucial initial transition period, despite its alliance with 
unions. Ost’s chapter makes a similar argument about Solidarity in Poland. These 
failures to act have enduring consequences, since in these cases labor’s best op­
portunity for shaping institutions—during the critical juncture—was lost.
Ideological legacies can shape the availability of labor’s coalition partners 
as well. In the Philippines, the rise of a powerful Communist Party during the 
1980s simultaneously divided progressive forces, impairing their capacity to push 
for change, and unified political elites in opposing deeper reforms (Hutchison, 
this volume). In both Korea and Indonesia, the virulent anticommunism under 
authoritarianism eradicated organized traces of the Left and delegitimized left­
ist ideas. The absence of Left parties, in turn, limited the potential coalition 
partners for labor. In Indonesia, unions also internalized the Suharto regime’s 
labor-relations philosophy, which posited that unions should not be involved in 
politics.
But ideological legacies can also be empowering, as Yoonkyung Lee demon­
strates in her discussion of Korean and Taiwanese unions (chapter 2). The Korean 
Confederation of Trade Union’s (KCTU) militancy and lack of leftist political 
allies led it to reject collaboration with nonprogrammatic parties. The KCTU 
formed an independent labor party instead, despite an unfavorable electoral sys­
tem that made it tough to win seats. After persuading the Constitutional Court of 
the unconstitutionality of the electoral system, the KCTU’s labor party eventually 
gained a prominent place in Korea’s legislature. By contrast, the legacy of mutual 
trust between parties and unions in Taiwan led both the legacy union and the
INTRODUCTION 19
largest independent union to continue to collaborate with their partisan allies. As 
a result, Taiwanese unions felt no need to establish an independent labor party.
This discussion of labor incorporation under authoritarian rule provides a 
rough map of the distinctions among countries, both within and across regions. 
The chapters in this volume further reveal important differences within these 
three forms of labor incorporation as well as interesting similarities across forms 
of incorporation. The key analytic point is that differences in labor incorporation 
under authoritarianism generate variations in labor legacies. These are inher­
ited by labor in new democracies, producing distinct starting points from which 
unions navigate the new democratic political terrain. In creating its future, then, 
labor must work through the past.
Conclusion: Legacies as Assets and Liabilities
The key argument of this volume is that authoritarian-era legacies matter for 
labor in new democracies. Whereas most analyses of authoritarian legacies tend 
to assume that these act primarily as constraints, one of our central findings is 
that legacies can function as both assets and liabilities. Rather than summarize 
the chapters in this volume, here we highlight their insights on how legacies em­
power or constrain workers in new democracies. Taken together, the chapters 
reveal the multiple ways that authoritarian-era legacies provide or limit resources, 
aid or constrain key social actors, and interact with democratic and market tran­
sition contexts. Within particular regional or subregional contexts that shared 
similar modes of labor incorporation, the analyses show how differences in lega­
cies and in transition contexts had profound consequences for how workers and 
unions fared in new democracies.
Teri Caraway’s chapter on Indonesia analyzes why organizationally weak 
unions that play a marginal role in formal politics have been remarkably effective 
in securing collective gains through mass mobilization. Caraway traces labor’s or­
ganizational weakness to the legacy of exclusionary corporatism that bequeathed 
Indonesia with low levels of unionization and conservative legacy organizations 
resistant to reform. In formal politics, the eradication of the Left under Suharto 
and the continued domination of the major political parties by Suharto-era elites 
limited the supply of viable partisan partners for unions after democratization. 
Legacies of economic unionism also led most unions to reject forming partisan 
alliances. Despite these unfavorable organizational and political legacies, how­
ever, other legacies have empowered labor. The survival of weak protections for 
the right to strike and the powerful tradition of wildcat protests pushed unions
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in the direction of relying primarily on demonstrations rather than collective 
bargaining to achieve collective goals. Tripartite institutions—also a legacy of 
the Suharto era—unified Indonesia’s fragmented unions behind collective goals. 
These two legacies facilitated the unification of workers in the large demonstra­
tions that were critical to labor’s victories.
Yoonkyung Lee’s chapter comparing South Korea and Taiwan outlines how 
authoritarian legacies simultaneously enable and constrain labor in new democ­
racies in counterintuitive ways. She grapples with the important question of why 
unions adopt distinct political strategies in new democracies. Lee shows that 
the legacy of party-union links under authoritarian rule explains why unions 
in South Korea and Taiwan, despite many similarities, followed distinct paths of 
political representation after the transition to democracy. Paradoxically, the more 
extreme exclusion of labor under authoritarian rule in South Korea turned out 
to be an asset that opened new political possibilities for labor after the transition 
to democracy, propelling the KCTU to establish a labor party rather than to seek 
accommodation with existing parties. In Taiwan, by contrast, unions followed 
the path of least resistance by maintaining ties to parties that were established 
under authoritarian rule. Although it would be erroneous to call Taiwan’s legacy 
a liability, since having partisan allies can also be an asset, the KCTU’s direct ac­
cess to the legislature without the mediation of nonlabor parties provided it with 
a stronger independent voice in national politics.
Jane Hutchison’s chapter offers a gloomier picture in which legacies have 
constrained rather than empowered workers. Despite almost thirty years of 
democracy, unions in the Philippines are perhaps weaker now than they were 
after the fall of Marcos. Hutchison traces labor’s predicament to the layering of 
preauthoritarian and authoritarian legacies. The Marcos regime left important 
elements of preexisting labor-relations institutions in place—most importantly, 
enterprise unionism and highly fragmented federations with tenuous links to 
their members. Unions therefore emerged from authoritarian rule organization­
ally weak. In addition, the emergence of leftist labor organizations during the 
Marcos period both exacerbated interunion divisions and laid the foundation 
for a radical flanking move by the newly democratic government, undercutting 
the leftist labor organizations by incorporating conservative labor leaders into 
tripartite institutions. At the same time, preauthoritarian legacies of decentral­
ized violence and authoritarian legacies of direct police and military repression 
of nonviolent political organizing created an extremely dangerous context for 
independent labor organizers who might challenge the conservative unions and 
advocate more strongly for worker interests.
In his chapter on Poland, David Ost makes clear that to categorize unions in 
postcommunist societies as either leftist or conservative is often misleading. The
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Communist system in Poland generated the spontaneous rise of Solidarity, argu­
ably the strongest workers’ movement in history. Yet while workers were central 
to bringing down the old regime, unions found themselves considerably ham­
pered by its legacies. The ideological valorization of labor under communism 
produced ironic results for workers in postcommunist Poland, since, according 
to Ost, “the ideological legacy consisted in the collapse of support for the very 
idea of organized labor or trade unions.” Solidarity retained significant symbolic 
clout and was nominally in control of the government for a time, but it pushed 
neoliberal policies that directly threatened workers. Thus for Ost the ideologi­
cal legacy is crucial. In Poland this was largely an anticommunist reaction to 
the previous regime, although this ideology grew out of specific institutional 
and structural arrangements from the past. Significantly, Polish workers did not 
seek simply to replace dictatorship with democracy. In the hope of living better 
they also sought to replace communism with capitalism, inadvertently deepening 
their subordinate status as a result. Given Solidarity’s key role in this process, Ost 
finds, paradoxically, that it initially behaved more like a “legacy union” than the 
Communist-created National Association of Trade Unions (OPZZ), which had 
to struggle against its rival to claim legitimacy.
Marko Grdesic’s chapter affirms that there is no single “communist legacy,” 
but that a single labor legacy—in this case, Yugoslav self-management—can ei­
ther enable or constrain depending on the political and economic environment 
in which it is planted. In Slovenia that legacy, when combined with favorable 
economic and political conditions, allowed for the transformation of the in­
stitutions of self-management into a unique postcommunist neocorporatism. 
Meanwhile, in increasingly nationalistic Croatia and Serbia, that same legacy was 
converted from an asset for labor into a liability, as unions and institutions of 
self-management came to be seen as holdovers from the old regime. The legacy 
of self-management spurred labor mobilization in all three cases, but with crucial 
differences in timing: in Slovenia labor mobilized during the critical juncture of 
the postcommunist transformation in order to forge privatization policies and 
other institutions that favored workers, whereas in Croatia and Serbia those mo­
bilizations followed in the wake of nationalist wars and were rearguard attempts 
to confront what workers perceived as the corrupt results of past privatizations.
In Russia, which had neither the potentially favorable experience of Yugoslav 
self-management nor the profound anticommunism of Poland, the constraints 
left by the Communist labor legacy are nevertheless distinctly visible, as the chap­
ter by Stephen Crowley confirms. There, in collaboration with the Russian state, 
Russia’s legacy union continues to dominate. However, rather than acting as a 
constant presence or one that fades over time, the legacy union, after losing of­
ficial favor with President Boris Yeltsin, was given renewed prominence under
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Putin, a process that coincided with Putin’s considerable restrictions on civil so­
ciety and democracy. Putin co-opted the legacy union at the expense of smaller 
alternative unions in order to contain labor protest. In so doing, he provided very 
few institutional channels through which workers might express their grievances, 
which instead occasionally erupt in the form of “extreme measures.” This prob­
lem is compounded by another legacy affecting labor, namely, the tenuous fate 
of Russia’s many one-industry towns or monogorods built in the Soviet era. Long 
starved of investment, a number of these industries (along with their towns) are 
teetering on bankruptcy. Here legacies constrain labor action, but at the cost of 
allowing grievances to fester.
Turning to Latin America, Graciela Bensusan and Maria Lorena Cook examine 
Argentina and Mexico, two countries that follow very different trajectories de­
spite similar legacies that originate with labor incorporation under inclusionary 
state-corporatist regimes. The authors focus on legal and institutional legacies 
and on the divergent ways in which institutional differences shape unions’ con­
texts and opportunities, leading to greater constraints on Mexican unions than 
on those in Argentina. The comparison reveals that despite broad similarities 
(state oversight, dominant unions, labor-based parties, limits on new unions), 
differences in legal and institutional design confer more power to employers in 
Mexico than in Argentina, a power held in check until economic liberalization. 
For instance, in Mexico a critical feature of institutional design allows employ­
ers to “choose” their bargaining counterpart, thus ensuring subordination to the 
wages, working conditions, and forms of collective representation set by the em­
ployer. In contrast, the lack of a similar feature in Argentina facilitates the greater 
autonomy of unions vis-a-vis employers. Bensusan and Cook show how these 
legacies enabled Argentine unions to recover after neoliberalism, yet continued 
to exclude competitors to dominant unions, while Mexican unions overall con­
tinued to erode after neoliberal and democratic transitions.
In Brazil, labor legacies facilitated periods of state control and labor move­
ment division, yet they also enabled militant unionists to operate—indeed, to 
flourish—within the prevailing legal and institutional structure. Adalberto Car­
doso focuses on legal legacies and explains why the labor code that originated 
in the state-corporatist era under President Getulio Vargas in the 1930s and 
1940s has proven remarkably resilient. Vargas’s initial incorporation of labor 
through the legal structure resonated with individual workers’ aspirations and 
bound workers to the capitalist project that Vargas was trying to create. This 
legal structure would survive challenges by both military regimes and by reform­
ers associated with the “new unionism” that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Indeed, reformers managed to occupy key positions within the labor structure
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during the dictatorship. Although Brazil’s legal legacies fostered divisions in the 
labor movement and enabled the state to exercise control, they also commanded 
the adherence of workers via the promise of inclusion. This aspiration to inclu­
sion came from laws that guaranteed (on paper, at least) formal-sector workers 
a range of social benefits. Even the more militant unions that emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s and were initially critical of the legally sanctioned subsidies to 
unions (because of their tendency to reinforce union bureaucracies that were out 
of touch with rank-and-file needs) ended up defending the labor code, seeing in 
it elements that guaranteed protection to unions during periods when they were 
most vulnerable.
In Chile, authoritarian-era labor legacies served to constrain unions during and 
after the democratic transition. Compared with the other Latin American cases 
represented here, the origins of Chile’s authoritarian legacies are also more recent 
in memory, especially as they relate to labor law. Volker Frank focuses on the lega­
cies of authoritarian-era labor laws and the reluctance of new democratic gov­
ernments to change these during the transition. This resistance to reform reflects 
the lingering presence of powerful ideologies from the dictatorship of Augusto 
Pinochet (1973-90) that continued to inform the new democratic governments. 
Frank’s chapter illustrates how these ideological legacies—reflected in a com­
mitment to maintaining market economic reforms and weak unions—helped 
to reproduce the legal constraints on workers’ collective interests and actions 
that originated under the dictatorship. Chilean unions, already weakened by the 
political repression and market reforms of the military regime, were unable to 
persuade their party allies to reverse important constraints on union formation, 
collective bargaining, and strikes. In this case, and in contrast to Brazil or Argen­
tina, labor legacies offer little to protect workers or buttress unions in democracy.
Finally, two chapters consider the comparative implications of authoritar­
ian legacies. In the first of these, Mary E. Gallagher (chapter 10) analyzes the 
evolution of labor-state relations in authoritarian China. She shows that even 
under a Communist authoritarian regime, transformations in labor relations 
take place. China has undergone a market transition without a political transi­
tion, which sets it apart from the other Communist cases in this volume, where 
these transitions happened simultaneously. Gallagher reflects not only on how 
market liberalization has unsettled Maoist-era labor institutions but also on how 
it might affect the authoritarian legacies that China would inherit if it were to 
democratize.
The conclusion, by Ruth Berins Collier and Andres Schipani, reflects on the 
volume’s contributions and offers a comparative assessment of the impact of au­
thoritarian legacies on labor in new democracies. Collier and Schipani highlight
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the dual nature of authoritarian legacies, which empower labor under some con­
ditions and weaken it under others. In particular, they point to tensions between 
democracy and authoritarian legacies that strengthen unions. The chapter also 
outlines processes of continuity and change across the cases and regions, noting 
that change is most dramatic in the Eastern European cases and least dramatic in 
the Latin American cases. Their chapter sets out a path for future research.
1STRENGTH AMID WEAKNESS
Legacies of Labor in Post-Suharto Indonesia
Teri L. Caraway
In Indonesia, the annual minimum wage negotiations give unions the opportu­
nity to end the year with a bang. Every year, unions flex their muscles in hopes 
of winning significant wage increases. The negotiations in 2011 were especially 
raucous, with unions mounting massive demonstrations in several major indus­
trial cities in Indonesia. On the island of Batam, thousands of workers calling 
for higher wages clashed with police. In the cities of Bekasi and Tangerang, tens 
of thousands of workers shut down industrial zones and blocked toll roads to 
demand the implementation of negotiated wage increases. In the capital city, 
Jakarta, the mere threat of a citywide strike was enough to cause the mayor to 
revise the minimum wage upward, over the objection of employers. The newspa­
pers hailed—and often lamented—a new era of labor militancy.
The mobilizational effectiveness of Indonesia’s unions is surprising. By con­
ventional measures of labor strength, Indonesia’s unions are feeble. Scattered 
across dozens of competing federations and thousands of unaffiliated enterprise 
unions, they organize only about 3 percent of the total work force. Union mem­
bership has declined since the early transition years as a consequence of shifts in 
employment, the increased flexibilization of the workforce, and union busting.1 
In the political arena, the major political parties have not built institutionalized 
links to labor, and union efforts to engage political parties have yielded meager 
results. But Indonesian unions have developed an impressive mobilizational ca­
pacity that has allowed them to secure among the strongest legal protections for 
workers in the region, to block efforts to pass more flexible labor laws, and to
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